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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Business & Financial Affairs >Discuss Whether Incentive Executive Compensation Poses Governance Issues
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Discuss Whether Incentive Executive Compensation Poses Governance Issues

机译：讨论激励性高管薪酬是否构成治理问题

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Executive compensation structures (joined with bank accounting regulations) encouraged the delivery of misleading information booking income “above the line,” however retaining liabilities off the balance sheet. Executives paid with stock options are motivated to increase the market value of shares, and this may be more simply done by increasing reported income than by increasing true profits. Though Sarbanes-Oxley fixed some of the problems that were uncovered in the Enron and associated scandals, it did nothing about stock options. With stock options not being expensed, shareholders frequently were not fully apprised of their cost. This provides durable incentives to pay exorbitant compensation through stock options. However, the use of stock options emboldens bad accounting practices.
机译：高管薪酬结构（与银行会计法规相结合）鼓励提供误导性的信息预订收入，“超出收入上限”，但将负债保留在资产负债表外。具有股票期权报酬的高管有动机提高股票的市场价值，这可以通过增加报告收入而不是通过增加真实利润来简单地完成。尽管萨班斯-奥克斯利法案修正了安然公司和相关丑闻中未发现的一些问题，但它对股票期权没有任何帮助。由于股票期权没有被支出，股东经常无法完全了解其成本。这提供了持久的激励措施，可以通过股票期权支付高昂的薪酬。但是，使用股票期权会加剧不良的会计惯例。

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