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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Governance and Regulation >MIRACULOUS FINANCIAL ENGINEERING OR TOXIC FINANCE? THE GENESIS OF THE U.S. SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LOANS CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS AND REAL ECONOMY
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MIRACULOUS FINANCIAL ENGINEERING OR TOXIC FINANCE? THE GENESIS OF THE U.S. SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LOANS CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS AND REAL ECONOMY

机译：神奇的金融工程还是有毒金融？美国次抵押贷款危机的产生及其在全球金融市场和实体经济中的后果

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In the fall of 2008, the U.S. subprime mortgage loans defaults have turned into Wall Street’s biggest crisis since the Great Depression. As hundreds of billions in mortgage-related investments went bad, banks became suspicious of one another’s potential undisclosed credit losses and preferred to reduce their exposure in the interbank markets, thus causing interbank interest rates and credit default swaps increases, a liquidity shortage problem and a worsened credit crunch condition to consumers and businesses. Massive cash injections into money markets and interest rates reductions have been assured by central banks in an attempt to shore up banks and to restore confidence within the financial system. Even Governments have promoted bail-out deal agreements, protections from bankruptcies, recapitalizations and bank nationalizations in order to rescue banks from disastrous bankruptcies. The credit crisis originated in the previous years when the Federal Reserve sharply lowered interest rates (Fed Funds at 1%) to limit the economic damage of the stock market decline due to the 2000 dot.com companies’ crisis. Lower interest rates made mortgage payments cheaper, and the demand for homes began to rise, sending prices up. In addition, millions of homeowners took advantage of the rate drop to refinance their existing mortgages. As the industry ramped up, the quality of the mortgages went down due to poor credit origination and credit risk assessment. Delinquency and default rates began to rise in 2006 as interest rates rose (Fed Funds at 5,25%) and poor households across the US struggled to pay off their mortgages. Many of them went bankrupt and lost their homes but the pace of lending did not slow. Banks have transformed much of the high-risk mortgage debt (securitizations) into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralised debt obligations (CDO), and have sold these assets on the financial markets to investment firms and insurance companies around the world, transferring to these investors the rights to the mortgage payments and the related credit risk. With the collapse of the first banks and hedge funds in 2007 the rising number of foreclosures helped speed the fall of housing prices, and the number of prime mortgages in default began to increase. As many CDO products were held on a “mark to market” basis, the paralysis in the credit markets and the collapse of liquidity in these products let to the dramatic write-downs in 2007. When stock markets in the United States, Europe and Asia continued to plunge, leading central banks took the drastic step of a coordinated cut in interest rates and Governments coordinated actions that included taking equity stakes in major banks. This paper written by the Author (on October 7th, 2008) at the rise of these dramatic events, aims to demonstrate, through solid and fact-based assumptions, that this dramatic global financial crisis could have been addressed and managed earlier and better by many of the stakeholders involved in the subprime mortgage lending process such as, banks’ and investment funds management, rating agencies, banking and financial markets supervisory authorities. It also unfortunately demonstrates the corporate social responsibility failure and the moral hazard of many key players involved in this crisis, since a lot of them probably knew quite well what was happening but have preferred not to do anything or to do little and late in order to change the dramatic course of the events.
机译：2008年秋天，美国次级抵押贷款违约已成为华尔街自大萧条以来最大的危机。随着数以千亿计的与抵押相关的投资恶化，银行开始怀疑彼此潜在的未披露信贷损失，并倾向于减少在银行间市场的敞口，从而导致银行间利率和信贷违约掉期增加，流动性短缺问题以及消费者和企业的信贷紧缩状况恶化。中央银行已确保向货币市场大量注入现金和降低利率，以试图支撑银行并恢复对金融体系的信心。甚至各国政府也提倡纾困协议，保护免受破产保护，资本重组和银行国有化，以使银行免于灾难性的破产。信贷危机源于前几年，当时美联储大幅降低了利率（联邦基金为1％），以限制由于2000年互联网公司的危机而导致的股市下跌的经济损失。较低的利率使抵押贷款支付变得更便宜，房屋需求开始上升，使价格上涨。此外，数百万的房主利用利率下降为现有抵押贷款再融资。随着行业的蓬勃发展，由于不良的信贷来源和信贷风险评估，抵押贷款的质量下降了。 2006年，随着利率上升（联邦基金利率为5.2％）以及美国各地的贫困家庭难以偿还抵押贷款，拖欠率和违约率开始上升。他们中的许多人破产并失去了住房，但放贷的步伐并未放缓。银行已将许多高风险抵押贷款债务（证券化）转换为抵押贷款支持证券（MBS）和抵押债务义务（CDO），并将这些资产在金融市场上出售给世界各地的投资公司和保险公司，这些投资者的抵押付款权利和相关的信用风险。随着2007年第一批银行和对冲基金的倒闭，丧失抵押品赎回权的数量不断增加，加速了房价的下跌，违约的主要抵押贷款数量也开始增加。由于许多CDO产品都是按“以市场为基准”持有的，因此信贷市场的瘫痪和这些产品的流动性崩溃导致2007年的资产减记额大幅下降。当美国，欧洲和亚洲的股票市场出现时持续下跌，领先的中央银行采取了协调一致的降息的激烈步骤，而政府采取的协调行动包括收购主要银行的股权。作者（2008年10月7日）在这些戏剧性事件兴起时撰写的这篇论文，旨在通过扎实和基于事实的假设来证明，这种戏剧性的全球金融危机本可以由许多人更早地解决和加以解决。次级抵押贷款过程中涉及的利益相关者，例如银行和投资基金管理，评级机构，银行和金融市场监管机构。不幸的是，这也证明了企业社会责任的失败和许多参与这场危机的关键参与者的道德风险，因为他们中的很多人可能都非常了解发生了什么，但他们宁愿不做任何事情或少做迟到，以便改变事件的戏剧性过程。

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