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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Statistical and Econometric Methods >Donor Compensation and the Elimination of the Organ Shortage in Spain: Evidence from Break Point Analysis
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Donor Compensation and the Elimination of the Organ Shortage in Spain: Evidence from Break Point Analysis

机译：西班牙的捐献者补偿与器官短缺的消除：断点分析的证据

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The shortage of organs in most countries around the globe is, as explained by economists, a result of legislation outlawing the buying and selling of human organs. Spain, for example, has prohibited the commodification of organs since 1979, yet the Spanish system of organ procurement goes beyond that of most other countries by allowing organ procurement officials to offer monetary compensation, which is generally presented as funeral cost assistance, to the families of potential deceased donors. As a result, Spain’s prior shortages have been eliminated, which means that Spain has stabilized and reduced the waiting list for kidney grafts. This study focuses on the lack of transparency inherent in the Spanish system of organ procurement, with the attendant likelihood that sub rosa payments perhaps extend beyond what is required to cover funeral costs. More specifically, we use a forecasting procedure – the Quandt-Andrews unknown break point test – to determine exactly when, after ONT revamped Spain’s model of organ procurement in 1989, the kidney shortage in Spain was eliminated and the country’s waiting list was stabilized (and began to fall). Our results indicate that Spain successfully addressed its previous kidney shortage by 1998, or about 10 years after implementation of the country’s compensation-based procurement model. Additionally, a meta-type analysis, using survey-based evidence from prior research, suggests that Spanish procurement officials may have been, at the time the kidney shortage was eliminated, providing the families of deceased donors a financial reward in the neighborhood of €1287 (in today’s currency).JEL Codes: D64; D72; I18
机译：正如经济学家所解释的那样，全球大多数国家的器官短缺是由于立法禁止买卖人体器官而造成的。例如，西班牙自1979年起就禁止器官的商品化，但西班牙的器官采购制度却超越了其他大多数国家，它允许器官采购官员向家庭提供金钱补偿，通常以丧葬费用援助的形式出现。潜在的已故捐助者。结果，西班牙先前的短缺得以消除，这意味着西班牙已经稳定并减少了肾脏移植的等待名单。这项研究的重点是西班牙器官采购系统固有的缺乏透明度，随之而来的可能是，小罗莎的付款可能超出了丧葬费用所需的范围。更具体地说，我们使用预测程序-Quandt-Andrews未知断点测试-准确确定在ONT于1989年修改西班牙的器官采购模型后，西班牙的肾脏短缺得到消除并且该国的候补名单稳定了的时间（以及开始下降）。我们的结果表明，西班牙成功地解决了以前的肾脏短缺问题，该问题是在1998年，即在实施基于补偿的采购模式后约10年。此外，使用先前研究中基于调查的证据进行的元类型分析表明，西班牙采购官员可能在肾脏短缺得到消除时为死者的家属提供了约1287欧元的经济奖励。 （以今天的货币）。JEL代码：D64; D72; I18

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