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Models of Voters and Politicians in a Digital Society under Uncertainty

机译：不确定性下数字社会中的选民和政客模型

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The paper considered 3 models of decision-making about voting for or against a politician in a digital society. These models correspond to different levels of voter awareness with random interference. In 1st model the decision making problem is solved for an experienced voter who knows the Bayesian characteristics of interference. In 2nd model a less experienced voter makes decisions using the recommendations of experts. To determine the optimal parameter of the decision rule, a stochastic approximation is proposed. In 3rd model asymmetric awareness of voter and politician about sociopolitical potential is considered. In this case, an unscrupulous politician may understate the socio-political indicator in order to maximize own goal function. That shifts an estimation of decision rule parameter. The voter is considered as apprentice using the recommendations of the mentor (i.e. expert not aware of that potential) for estimation and voting under uncertainty caused by both random interference and politician unwanted activity. Apprentice’s estimation and voting procedures constitute the voting mechanism. The set of politician choices has been determined, at which the maximum of his goal function is achieved with this voting mechanism. Sufficient conditions are proved for the synthesis of the optimal voting mechanism, in which politician chooses the socio-political indicator equal to the potential. So the optimal parameter of the decision rule is determined. Obtained results are illustrated by the example of a union of regional states governed by politicians elected by local societies.
机译：该论文考虑了关于数字社会中政客投票的三种决策模型。这些模型对应于具有随机干扰的不同级别的选民意识。在第一个模型中，决策问题由经验丰富的选民解决，他们知道干扰的贝叶斯特征。在第二种模式中，经验不足的选民会根据专家的建议进行决策​​。为了确定决策规则的最佳参数，提出了一种随机近似方法。在第三个模型中，考虑了选民和政治家对社会政治潜力的不对称意识。在这种情况下，不道德的政客可能低估了社会政治指标，以便最大化自己的目标功能。这就转移了决策规则参数的估计。选民被认为是学徒，是根据导师（即不了解这种潜力的专家）的建议进行的，用于在随机干扰和政客不必要的活动造成的不确定性下进行估计和投票。学徒的估计和投票程序构成了投票机制。确定了一系列政客选择，在这种情况下，通过该投票机制可以实现他最大的目标功能。证明了综合最佳投票机制的条件，在这种机制中，政客选择与潜力相等的社会政治指标。因此确定了决策规则的最佳参数。以由地方社会选举产生的政客统治的地区国家联盟为例，说明了取得的结果。

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