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Game Analysis on the Government’s Economic Subsidy in Regional Environmental Protection

机译：政府对区域环境保护的经济补贴博弈分析

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摘要

From the perspective of game theory, this paper analyzed the promotion effect of government subsidy policy on environmental governance. Three main results were obtained as follows. 1. A positive effect is achieved when the government increases the amount of penalties imposed on companies and uses fines as a reward subsidy to environmental companies. Such policy can not only improve the probability of pollution control by enterprises, but also enable the government to reduce the regulatory costs in environmental issues. 2. When government departments choose small enterprises for environmental protection subsidies, they can not only greatly increase the probability of pollution control by enterprises, but also increase the complexity of government supervision. 3. The government needs to strengthen supervision to maintain the high probability of pollution control by enterprises.
机译：从博弈论的角度，分析了政府补贴政策对环境治理的促进作用。获得了以下三个主要结果。 1.当政府增加对公司的罚款并使用罚款作为对环境公司的奖励补贴时，将产生积极的效果。这种政策不仅可以提高企业进行污染控制的可能性，还可以使政府减少环境问题上的监管成本。 2.政府部门选择小企业进行环保补贴时，不仅会大大增加企业污染控制的机率，而且会增加政府监管的复杂性。 3.政府需要加强监管，以保持企业高污染控制的可能性。

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