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Incentive Mechanisms for Tacit Knowledge-Sharing in Master-Apprentice Pattern Based on The Principal-Agent Theory

机译：基于委托-代理理论的学徒模式隐性知识共享激励机制

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摘要

Continual knowledge sharing is the key to improve the competitive ability, operation ability and innovative ability of the organization. Through the comparison of the game theory, knowledge market theory and the principal-agent theory, the principal-agent theory is more suitable for the research on the incentive mechanism of tacit knowledge sharing in master-apprentice Pattern. During the process of tacit knowledge sharing in master-apprentice Pattern, different types of tacit knowledge determine the different design of incentive mechanisms.When the master and the apprentice share the inexpressible tacit knowledge, the organization does not need to design any incentive mechanism for promoting the master’s knowledge sharing.When master and apprentice share the expressible tacit knowledge, the organization needs to design different incentive mechanisms for the master and the apprentice respectively. Moreover the organization needs to take into account the different master-apprentice models in different departments. So the organization needs to design different incentive mechanisms for different departments in order to furtherance the tacit knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern.
机译：持续的知识共享是提高组织的竞争能力，运营能力和创新能力的关键。通过博弈论，知识市场理论和委托-代理理论的比较，委托-代理理论更适合研究主从模式下隐性知识共享的激励机制。在主学徒模式中的隐性知识共享过程中，不同类型的隐性知识决定了激励机制的不同设计，当主学徒共享不可表达的隐性知识时，组织无需设计任何激励机制来促进当主人和学徒共享可表达的隐性知识时，组织需要分别为主人和学徒设计不同的激励机制。此外，组织需要考虑不同部门中不同的主学徒模式。因此，组织需要针对不同部门设计不同的激励机制，以促进主学徒模式下的隐性知识共享。

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