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Research on the Dynamics Game Model in a Green Supply Chain: Government Subsidy Strategies under the Retailer’s Selling Effort Level

机译:绿色供应链中动力学游戏模型的研究:零售商销售努力下的政府补贴策略

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Based on dynamic game theory and the principal-agent theory, this paper examined different government subsidy strategies in green supply chain management. Assuming that the retailer’s level of selling effort involved asymmetric information, this study analyzed the impact of different government subsidy strategies on the wholesale price, the product greenness level, retail price, the level of selling effort, the manufacturer’s profit, and the retailer’s profit. The results showed that (1) the government’s subsidy strategy can effectively not only improve the product greenness level but also increase the profits of an enterprise in a green supply chain, which helps the retailer to enhance their selling effort; (2) regardless of whether the retailer’s level of selling effort was high or low, as the government’s subsidy coefficient increased, the wholesale price continued to decrease, and the product greenness level and retailer’s selling effort level also increased.
机译:基于动态博弈论和委托 - 代理理论,本文审查了绿色供应链管理中的不同政府补贴策略。假设零售商的销售水平涉及不对称信息,本研究分析了不同政府补贴策略对批发价格的影响,产品绿色水平,零售价,销售水平,制造商的利润和零售商的利润。结果表明,(1)政府的补贴策略可以有效地有效地改善了产品绿色水平,而且还可以提高绿色供应链中企业的利润,这有助于零售商加强其销售努力; (2)无论零售商的销售水平高还是低,随着政府的补贴系数增加,批发价格持续下降,产品绿色水平和零售商销售努力水平也增加。

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