Research paper A gas-on-gas competition trading mechanism based on cooperative game models in China’s gas market

Xutao Rui; Lianyong Feng; Jingxuan Feng

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Research paper A gas-on-gas competition trading mechanism based on cooperative game models in China’s gas market

机译：研究论文基于中国煤气市场合作博弈模型的气体竞争交易机制

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A growing number of major natural gas markets in the world have adopted the gas-on-gas competition, or are in the phase of transition to this price formation mechanism. In this situation, China has also started to reform the pricing mechanism by establishing gas trading centers in Shanghai and Chongqing, providing platforms for sellers and buyers to complete the competition-based transactions, marking a transition from oil index pricing to gas-on-gas competition pricing. In order to carry out research on China’s gas market based on gas-on-gas competition trading mechanism, this paper builds a natural gas trading model based on cooperative game theory, discusses the key parameter in the models, taking into account of the representative issues of China’s gas market in transformation. Also, this paper designs scenarios based on Jiangsu Province, a relatively well-established gas trading market in China, and explores the impact of each issue on the market by using the comparative analysis and sensitivity analysis. This study concludes that establishing the gas-on-gas competition model corresponds to the current gas market development in China. In addition, the market participants need to optimize the contract modes of gas supply, reduce gas supply cost and improve the price affordability, in order to maximize the cooperation benefits in gas market, increase the trading volume, promotes the development and maturation of China’s gas market.

机译：世界上越来越多的世界主要天然气市场采用了气体燃气竞争，或者在这种价格形成机制的转型期间。在这种情况下，中国还开始通过在上海和重庆建立煤气交易中心，为卖方和买家提供平台来改革定价机制，以完成基于比赛的交易，从石油指数定价到气体的过渡。竞争定价。为了基于煤气竞争交易机制对中国的天然气市场进行研究，本文建立了一个基于合作博弈论的天然气交易模式，讨论了模型中的关键参数，考虑到代表性问题中国煤气市场转型。此外，本文设计基于江苏省的江苏省在中国相对熟悉的天然气交易市场，通过使用比较分析和敏感性分析来探讨每个问题对市场的影响。本研究结论，建立气体竞争模式对应于中国当前的天然气市场发展。此外，市场参与者需要优化气体供应的合同模式，降低燃气供应成本，提高价格负担能力，以最大限度地提高天然气市场的合作效益，提高交易量，促进中国天然气的发展和成熟市场。

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《Energy Reports》 |2020年第1期|共13页
作者
Xutao Rui; Lianyong Feng; Jingxuan Feng;
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ChinaNatural gas marketGas-on-gas competitionCooperative gamesShapley value;

机译：中国天然气市场 - 燃气竞争合作游戏福利价值;

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Research paper A gas-on-gas competition trading mechanism based on cooperative game models in China’s gas market

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