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首页> 外文期刊>Theoretical Economics Letters >Normative Utility Models for Pareto Scalar Equilibria in n-Person, Semi-Cooperative Games in Strategic Form
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Normative Utility Models for Pareto Scalar Equilibria in n-Person, Semi-Cooperative Games in Strategic Form

机译：帕累托标量均衡的规范性效用模型，战略形式的半合作游戏

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摘要

Semi-cooperative games in strategic form are considered in which either a negotiation among the n players determines their actions or else an arbitrator specifies them. Methods are presented for selecting such action profiles by using multiple-objective optimization techniques. In particular, a scalar equilibrium (SE) is an action profile for the style="font-family:Verdana;">n style="font-family:Verdana;"> players that maximize a utility function over the acceptable joint actions. Thus the selection of “solutions” to the game involves the selection of an acceptable utility function. In a greedy SE, the goal is to assign individual actions giving each player the largest payoff jointly possible. In a compromise SE, the goal is to make individual player payoffs equitable, while a satisficing SE achieves a target payoff level while weighting each player for possible additional payoff. These SEs are formally defined and shown to be Pareto optimal over the acceptable joint actions of the players. The advantage of these SEs is that they involve only pure strategies that are easily computed. Examples are given, including some well-known coordination games, and the worst-case time complexity for obtaining these SEs is shown to be linear in the number of individual payoffs in the payoff matrix. Finally style="font-family:Verdana;">, style="font-family:Verdana;"> the SEs of this paper are checked against some standard game-theoretic bargaining axioms.
机译：考虑以战略形式进行半合作博弈，其中N个玩家之间的谈判决定了他们的行为，否则仲裁员指定它们。提出了通过使用多目标优化技术选择这种动作配置文件的方法。特别是，标量均衡（SE）是 style =“font-family：verdana;”> n style =“font-family：verdana ;“>最大限度地通过可接受的联合行动最大限度地发挥效用的玩家。因此，对游戏的选择“解决方案”涉及选择可接受的实用程序功能。在贪婪的SE中，目标是分配每个球员的个人行动，使每个球员共同获得最大的回报。在一个妥协中，目标是使个人球员支付公平，而令人满意的SE可以实现目标收益水平，同时加权每个玩家，以获得可能的额外收益。这些SES在正式定义并显示为Pareto最佳的参与者的可接受联合行动。这些SES的优点是它们仅涉及易于计算的纯策略。给出了一个示例，包括一些众所周知的协调游戏，以及获得这些SES的最坏情况的复杂性被证明是在支付矩阵中的单个收益的数量中是线性的。最后 style =“font-family：verdana;”>， style =“font-family：verdana;”>检查本文的SES，针对一些标准游戏 - 理论票价检查公理。

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