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Government Low-Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

机译:政府低碳规定基于供应链成员的行为和消费者的渠道偏好在双通道供应链中

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As carbon emissions are increasing due to the development of economy, low-carbon supply chain plays an important role in carbon emissions reduction and the dual-channel supply chain has become a hit because online shopping is developing rapidly. Therefore, this paper builds a Stackelberg game model led by the manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain to examine the reaction of the government under centralized or decentralized decisions-making structures with different low-carbon strategies. The result shows that the government can achieve higher profits by taking incentive or punitive measures for centralized decision-making supply chain no matter they invest in emissions reduction or not. Moreover, for decentralized decision-making mode, increasing low-carbon subsidies for retailers can achieve a win-win result between the supply chain and the government; and, finally, channel competition is good for improving the supply chain and social benefits. Therefore, the government is responsible for taking reasonable subsidy policies, formulate industry’s low-carbon standards, and properly guide competition between supply chain members to achieve higher profits.
机译:由于碳排放因经济的发展而越来越大,低碳供应链在碳排放减少中发挥着重要作用,双通道供应链已成为击中,因为在线购物正在迅速发展。因此,本文建立了由制造商领导的Stackelberg游戏模型,在双通道供应链中,检查政府在具有不同低碳策略的集中或分散决策结构下的反应。结果表明,无论他们投资于减少排放量,政府都可以通过采取集中式决策供应链的激励或惩罚措施来实现更高的利润。此外,对于分散的决策模式,增加零售商的低碳补贴可以在供应链和政府之间实现双赢的结果;最后,渠道竞争对于提高供应链和社会福利有利。因此,政府负责采取合理的补贴政策,制定行业的低碳标准,并妥善指导供应链成员之间的竞争,以实现更高的利润。

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