首页> 外文期刊>Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie >Out-Kanting Rawls: An Argument for Responsibility-Sensitive Theories of Justice from an Autonomy-Based Account of Normativity
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Out-Kanting Rawls: An Argument for Responsibility-Sensitive Theories of Justice from an Autonomy-Based Account of Normativity

机译:超越康特·罗尔斯:基于自治的规范性论证对责任敏感的正义论证

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摘要

When considering normative concepts, such as distributive justice, one nmust consider both the question how concepts can have normative force and which nparticular conceptions of these concepts have this normative force. In this article I nconsider the view that the human capacity for autonomy accounts for normativity, and nargue that adopting this view commits one to a responsibility-sensitive theory of dis-ntributive justice. This conclusion puts me directly at odds with the work of John Rawls, nwho derives his responsibility-insensitive difference principle from a similar account of nautonomy. However, I argue that such an argument would be based on a mischarac-nterisation of what is signifi cant about the human capacity for autonomy.
机译:在考虑诸如分配正义之类的规范性概念时,必须考虑以下两个问题:概念如何具有规范性,以及这些概念中哪些特定的概念具有规范性。在本文中,我考虑了一种观点,即人类的自主能力是规范性的考虑因素,而采用这种观点的说法则是一种对责任感敏感的分配正义理论。这个结论使我直接与约翰·罗尔斯(John Rawls)的工作背道而驰,约翰·罗尔斯(John Rawls)从类似的非自治理论中得出了他的责任不敏感差异原则。但是,我认为这样的论点是基于对人类自主能力的重要意义的误判。

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