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首页> 外文期刊>Ecological Complexity >Interaction characteristics as evolutionary features for the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma in a population modeled by continuous probabilistic cellular automata and evolutionary algorithm
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Interaction characteristics as evolutionary features for the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma in a population modeled by continuous probabilistic cellular automata and evolutionary algorithm

机译：相互作用特征作为空间囚犯在持续概率蜂窝自动机和进化算法模型中群体中的空间囚犯困境的进化特征

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摘要

Evolutionary games usually take into consideration individuals' strategies as the transformative characteristic which leads to the evolution of the population. Here, besides the strategies, interaction aspects are also considered as evolutionary attributes which can change over time as the replacement dynamic renovates the population choosing locally better individuals to reproduce. The population is modeled by cellular automata, interactions by the Prisoner's Dilemma game and the replacement process is ruled by two versions of death-birth dynamic. Although the average payoff per game is considered as the fitness for choosing better individuals, the number of games per time step and a maximum radius of interaction with neighbours are also present in the individual's chromosome which is passed to the next generation. Numerical simulations show that individual interaction properties and cooperation level are linked to the version of death-birth dynamic used and the game payoff. For instance, when the fitness bias is on the death event, individuals have more interactions in a larger radius, and the cooperation level is usually lower than the case where the fitness bias is on the birth event. Also, the individuals' interaction profiles are heterogeneous, and cooperative individuals form clusters in the lattice to protect themselves.
机译：进化游戏通常考虑个人的策略作为转型性的特征，从而导致人口的演变。这里，除了策略之外，交互方面也被认为是进化属性，随着替代动态更换的时间，可以随时间改变，更换了局部更好的个人来重现。人口由蜂窝自动机制建模，囚犯困境游戏的互动和替代过程由两种版本的死亡生育动态统治。虽然每场比赛的平均收益被视为选择更好的个人的健身，但是每个时间步长的游戏数量和与邻居的最大互动半径也存在于传递到下一代的染色体中。数值模拟表明，个人互动性能和合作水平与使用的死亡动态和游戏收益的版本相关联。例如，当健身偏置在死亡事件上时，个体在较大的半径中具有更多的相互作用，并且合作水平通常低于健身偏差在出生事件上的情况。此外，个人的相互作用曲线是异构的，并且合作个体在格子中形成簇以保护自己。

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