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首页> 外文期刊>The economic journal >Knowing when to Quit: Default Choices, Demographics and Fraud
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Knowing when to Quit: Default Choices, Demographics and Fraud

机译：知道何时退出：默认选择，人口统计和欺诈

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摘要

We study defaults in a novel setting where the optimal choice is clear: the decision to escape from fraud. A government lawsuit created a natural experiment whereby some consumers enrolled in a fraudulent subscription programme were cancelled by default, while others had to cancel actively. We find that cancelling subscriptions by default increased cancellations to 99.8%, 63.4 percentage points more than requiring active cancellation. We also find that consumers residing in poorer, less-educated Census blocks were more likely than average to cancel prior to the lawsuit but were less likely to actively cancel when notified they could do so.
机译：我们在新颖的环境中研究违约情况，在这种情况下，最佳选择显而易见：逃避欺诈的决策。一项政府诉讼创造了一个自然的实验，在该实验中，默认情况下取消了一些注册了欺诈性订阅程序的消费者，而其他消费者则必须主动取消。我们发现，默认情况下，取消订阅将取消数量增加到99.8％，比要求主动取消的数量多63.4个百分点。我们还发现，居住在较贫困，受教育程度较低的人口普查区的消费者在诉讼之前被取消的可能性高于平均水平，但在接到通知后可以主动取消的可能性较小。

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