• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Economic Theory >Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity
【24h】

Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity

机译：具有内生财富异质性的保险市场竞争性筛选

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection when wealth differences arise endogenously from unobservable savings or labor supply decisions. The endogeneity of wealth implies that high-risk individuals may ceteris paribus exhibit the lower marginal willingness to pay for insurance than low risks, a phenomenon that we refer to as irregular-crossing preferences. In our model, both risk and patience (or productivity) are privately observable. In contrast to the models in the existing literature, where wealth heterogeneity is exogenously assumed, equilibria in our model no longer exhibit a monotone relation between risk and coverage. Individuals who purchase larger coverage are no longer higher risks, a phenomenon frequently observed in empirical studies.
机译：当财富差异是由于无法观察到的储蓄或劳动力供应决策而内生地产生时，我们会通过不利的选择来检验竞争性保险市场中的均衡。财富的内生性意味着高风险的个人可能会比其他低风险的个人表现出更低的支付保险的边际意愿，这种现象我们称为不规则交叉偏好。在我们的模型中，个人可以观察到风险和耐心（或生产率）。与现有文献中假定财富异质性的现有模型相反，我们模型中的均衡不再表现出风险与覆盖率之间的单调关系。购买更大保险的个人不再具有更高的风险，这是一项在经验研究中经常观察到的现象。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号