...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Economic Theory >On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
【24h】

On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences

机译：关于公共弊端的定位：二维单浸偏好下的策略证明

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a polytope in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the polytope. A point x of the polytope is called single-best if there is a point y of the polytope such that x is the unique point of the polytope at maximal distance from y. It is proved that if the polytope does not have either exactly two single-best points or exactly four single-best points which form the vertices of a rectangle, then any Pareto optimal and strategy-proof rule is dictatorial. If the polytope has exactly two single-best points, then there are non-dictatorial strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rules, which can be described by committee voting (simple games) between the two single-best points. This also holds if there are exactly four single-best points which form the vertices of a rectangle, but in that case, we limit ourselves to describing an example of such a rule. The framework under consideration models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within a confined region.
机译：在一个模型中，只有有限数量的代理在欧几里得平面上的多面体上具有单浸式欧几里得偏好，规则会为报告的下垂的每个轮廓分配一个多义点。如果多面体的点y使得多面体的点x称为单峰，则x是距y的最大距离处的多面体的唯一点。事实证明，如果多面体既不具有形成矩形顶点的恰好两个单最优点，又不具有恰好四个单个最优点，那么任何帕累托最优和防策略规则都是独裁的。如果多面体恰好有两个最佳单点，则存在非独裁策略证明和帕累托最优规则，这可以通过两个最佳单点之间的委员会投票（简单博弈）来描述。如果恰好有四个最好的点构成一个矩形的顶点，这也成立，但是在那种情况下，我们将自己局限于描述这样一个规则的例子。所考虑的框架模拟了必须将公共废物（例如垃圾场或核电厂）放置在狭窄区域内的情况。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Economic Theory》 |2014年第1期|83-108|共26页
  • 作者

    Murat OEztuerk; Hans Peters; Ton Storcken;

  • 作者单位

    Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands;

    Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands;

    Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands;

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Single-dipped preferences; Pareto optimality; Strategy-proofness; Committee voting;

    机译：一浸式偏好帕累托最优具有策略性;委员会投票;

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号