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On myopia as rationale for social security

机译：以近视作为社会保障的依据

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摘要

It has been argued that "paternalistically motivated forced savings constitutes an important, and to some the most important, rationale for social security retirement systems." This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security in dynamically efficient economies. If the competing asset is linear storage and myopic agents are allowed to borrow against future pension benefits, there is no welfare-rationale for PAYG pensions. Sufficiently strong myopia may justify such pensions only if agents cannot borrow against their future pension, but then they are at a zero-saving corner. With enough myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the return to saving declines with saving, as in a model with a neoclassical technology.
机译：有人认为，“家长式动机的强迫储蓄构成了社会保障退休制度的重要且在某些方面最重要的理由”。本文回顾了近视在为动态高效经济中的即付即付（PAYG）社会保障产生理论依据方面所发挥的作用。如果竞争资产是线性存储，并且允许近视代理商借用未来的养老金福利，则现收现付养老金没有福利标准。只有当代理人不能借用其未来的养老金，但足够近视的情况下，足够强的近视才有可能证明这种养老金是合理的，但是他们处于零储蓄的角落。有了足够的近视眼，如果储蓄的回报随着储蓄而下降，那么正最优养老金和正私人储蓄就可能并存，就像在采用新古典技术的模型中那样。

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