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JUDGMENT AGGREGATION AND SUBJECTIVE DECISION-MAKING

机译：判断集结与主观决策

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摘要

I present an original model in judgment aggregation theory that demonstrates the general impossibility of consistently describing decision-making purely at the group level. Only a type of unanimity rule can guarantee a group decision is consistent with supporting reasons, and even this possibility is limited to a small class of reasoning methods. The key innovation is that this result holds when individuals can reason in different ways, an allowance not previously considered in the literature. This generalizes judgment aggregation to subjective decision situations, implying that the discursive dilemma persists without individual agreement on the logical constraints. Notably, the model mirrors the typical method of choosing political representatives, and thus suggests that no voting procedure other than unanimity rule can guarantee representation that reflects electorate opinion. Finally, I apply the results to a normative argument for unanimity rule in contract theory and juries, as well as to problems posed for deliberative democratic theory and the concept of representation.
机译：我提出了一种判断聚合理论的原始模型，该模型证明了纯粹不可能在团体层面上一致地描述决策的一般可能性。只有一种一致规则可以保证组决策与支持原因一致，甚至这种可能性也仅限于一小类推理方法。关键的创新在于，当个人可以以不同的方式进行推理时，这一结果就成立了，这是文献中以前未曾考虑过的。这将判断聚合概括为主观决策情况，这意味着在没有逻辑约束的单独同意的情况下，话语困境仍然存在。值得注意的是，该模型反映了选择政治代表的典型方法，因此表明，除一致通过规则外，任何投票程序都不能保证代表选举人意见的代表权。最后，我将结果应用于合同理论和陪审团关于统一规则的规范性论证，以及商议性民主理论和代表概念提出的问题。

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