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Private law enforcement with competing groups

机译：与竞争团体的私人执法

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摘要

This paper introduces groups that are in conflict against each other in law enforcement policy. These groups can have an effect on the process of law enforcement by making upfront investments, such as bribes. We also investigate consequences when a policy maker acts to maximize a bribe instead of social welfare. Thus, this paper presents an inclusive framework for incorporating private law enforcement, corruption and avoidance activities. This article shows that this competition can lead to moderate and more efficient law enforcement activities. This indicates that inefficient law enforcement by authority with harm reduction motivation can be avoided. Additionally, this paper shows that depending on the policy maker's objection between rent-seeking motivation or social welfare maximizer, deterrence effects vary. This paper provides a clear mechanism that the rent-seeking motivated policy maker tends to set less severe enforcement policies than the social welfare level.
机译：本文介绍了在执法政策上相互冲突的群体。这些团体可以通过进行诸如贿赂之类的前期投资来对执法过程产生影响。当决策者采取行动以最大程度地贿赂而不是社会福利时，我们还将调查后果。因此，本文提出了一个包容性框架，将私法执法，腐败和回避活动纳入其中。本文表明，这种竞争可以导致适度，更有效的执法活动。这表明可以避免以减少伤害为动机的权力机构执法效率低下。此外，本文表明，根据决策者对寻租动机或社会福利最大化者的反对，威慑作用也有所不同。本文提供了一个明确的机制，即寻租动机的决策者倾向于制定比社会福利水平低的严格执行政策。

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