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Within-group heterogeneity and civil war

机译：组内异质性与内战

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摘要

This study offers a bargaining model of conflict in which the government offers a transfer to an opposition group to preclude civil war. Members of the opposition are heterogeneous in income and ideology, and heterogeneity generates disagreement about whether to accept the government's offer. We assume that the probability that the government's offer will preclude conflict increases continuously with the number of opposition group members who agree to accept it. When within-group heterogeneity is large, the number of members who are receptive to the government's offer is less responsive to an increase in the transfer level. In this situation, the government must substantially increase its transfer to attract the support of the opposition. Subsequently, as peace becomes more costly for the government, negotiations are likely to break down.
机译：这项研究提供了一个讨价还价的冲突模型，其中政府向反对派组织提供转移以防止内战。反对派成员的收入和意识形态各不相同，而异质性导致人们对是否接受政府的提议产生分歧。我们假设，政府提议要避免冲突的可能性会随着同意接受反对派团体成员的人数而不断增加。当集团内部的异质性很大时，接受政府提议的成员数量对转移水平的提高反应较小。在这种情况下，政府必须大幅度增加转移支付以吸引反对派的支持。随后，随着和平对于政府而言变得更加昂贵，谈判可能会破裂。

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