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Local fiscal policy after a bailout: austerity or soft budget constraints?

机译：纾困后的地方财政政策：紧缩还是软预算约束？

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Do higher-level governments enforce austerity after bailing out indebted subnational governments or are bailouts a free lunch for the recipients? Analyzing this question empirically is difficult because bailouts are not granted randomly. This paper suggests a method to evaluate the fiscal consequences of subnational bailouts that does not rely on institutional details to obtain quasi-exogenous variation. The main idea is to combine matching and difference-in-differences designs. In a second step, I apply this method to study how bailouts affect the fiscal policy of recipient municipalities in the German federal state of Hesse. Combining disaggregated budget data with data on bailout payments over more than a decade, I find that municipalities consolidate their budgets after they receive a bailout from the state government. While this finding is specific to the German federal context, the proposed methodology can be used, due to its flexibility, to study the fiscal consequences of bailouts in various other settings.
机译：上级政府在救助负债累累的地方政府后会实施紧缩政策，还是对受援国免费提供午餐？从经验上分析这个问题很困难，因为紧急援助不是随机授予的。本文提出了一种不依赖机构细节来获得准外生变量的评估地方救助计划财政后果的方法。主要思想是将匹配和差异设计相结合。在第二步中，我将应用这种方法研究纾困计划如何影响德国黑森州联邦接收城市的财政政策。将分类的预算数据与十多年来的救助付款数据结合在一起，我发现市政当局在收到州政府的救助资金后合并了他们的预算。虽然此发现是特定于德国联邦背景的，但由于其灵活性，可以使用所提出的方法来研究在其他各种情况下的救助计划的财政后果。

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