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A political-economy perspective on social expenditures: corruption and in-kind versus cash transfers

机译：社会支出的政治经济学观点：腐败，实物与现金转移

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摘要

This paper presents a novel political-economy perspective on the composition of social expenditures. We take into account the possibility that institutions are weak, i.e. there is corruption, and analyze how this affects the government's choice between cash and in-kind transfers. Our results show that the share of in-kind transfers (e.g. basic health care, public housing or food stamps), whose appropriation by corrupt politicians is more easily observed than in the case of cash transfers, increases with corruption. This positive relationship exists, however, only in highly democratic countries. We argue that voters use their political influence in democratic countries to ensure that a higher share of transfers is provided in kind thereby shielding transfers from appropriation by corrupt politicians.
机译：本文提出了一种关于社会支出构成的新颖政治经济学观点。我们考虑了机构薄弱（即存在腐败）的可能性，并分析了这如何影响政府在现金和实物转移之间的选择。我们的结果表明，实物转移（例如基本医疗保健，公共住房或食品券）的份额比腐败转移时更容易被腐败政客挪用，这种份额随腐败而增加。但是，这种积极关系仅在高度民主的国家中存在。我们认为，选民利用其在民主国家的政治影响力来确保提供更高比例的实物转移，从而保护转移不受腐败政客的挪用。

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