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Endogenous party structure

机译：内生政党结构

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摘要

This paper proposes a model of two-party representative democracy on a single-dimensional political space, in which voters choose their parties in order to influence the parties' choices of representative. After two candidates are selected as the median of each party's support group, Nature determines the candidates' relative likability (valence). Based on the candidates' political positions and relative likability, voters vote for the preferable candidate without being tied to their party's choice. We show that (1) there exists a nontrivial equilibrium under natural conditions, and (2) the equilibrium party border and the ex ante probabilities of the two-party candidates winning are sensitive to the distribution of voters. In particular, we show that if a party has a more concentrated subgroup, then the party tends to alienate its centrally located voters, and the party's probability of winning the final election is reduced. Even if voter distribution is symmetric, an extremist party (from either side) can emerge as voters become more politically divided.
机译：本文提出了一种在一维政治空间内的两党代议制民主模型，在该模型中，选民选择政党是为了影响政党对代表的选择。在选择两名候选人作为每个政党支持小组的中位数后，自然决定了候选人的相对喜好（价）。根据候选人的政治立场和相对的亲和力，选民可以投票选出较可取的候选人，而不必与政党的选择挂钩。我们证明（1）在自然条件下存在一个非平凡的均衡，（2）均衡的政党边界和两党候选人获胜的事前概率对选民的分布敏感。特别是，我们表明，如果一个政党的子群体更加集中，那么该政党往往会疏远其位于中央的选民，从而降低了该党赢得最终选举的可能性。即使选民分配是对称的，随着选民在政治上的分歧越来越大，极端主义政党（双方）也可能出现。

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