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No fight, no loss: underinvestment in experimental contest games

机译：没有战斗就没有损失：对实验比赛游戏的投资不足

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摘要

This paper reports a series of laboratory experiments intended to identify conditions that attenuate the overdissipation of rents typical of experimental contest games. We examine the influences on contestant behavior of the observability and timing of preceding bids, allocation rules for the situation when no bids occur (random prize allocation vs. prize loss) and matching protocol for repeated contests involving pairs of bidders. Our results show that the simultaneous presence of three factors (simultaneous bids, random prize allocation if no bids occur and fixed matching) allows contestants to coordinate to realize efficient outcomes (underbidding). However, the absence of one of these factors causes overbidding to return. From the perspective of theoretical prediction, the decision to allocate the prize even when no bids occur (no fight, no loss) should be irrelevant. However, this allocation decision may strongly influence behaviour (by encouraging submission of efficient and minimal bids) if combined with features that encourage collusion (fixed matching and symmetry).
机译：本文报告了一系列实验室实验，旨在确定可减轻典型实验竞赛游戏租金过度耗散的条件。我们研究了对可观察性和先前出价时间，对没有出价的情况下的分配规则（随机奖励分配与奖励损失）的分配规则以及涉及成对竞标者的重复竞赛的匹配协议的影响。我们的结果表明，同时存在三个因素（同时竞标，如果没有竞标则随机分配奖金和固定匹配）可以使参赛者进行协调以实现有效的结果（竞标不足）。但是，缺少这些因素之一会导致竞价再次出现。从理论预测的角度来看，即使没有出价（不打架，不损失），也没有必要分配奖品。但是，如果与鼓励串通的功能（固定匹配和对称性）结合使用，则此分配决策可能会强烈影响行为（通过鼓励提交有效的最低出价）。

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