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Insider regulation and the incentive to invest as an insider

机译：内部人监管和作为内部人投资的动机

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摘要

There is an ongoing debate about the pros and cons of regulating insider transactions. We contribute to this debate by showing that the investor may prefer tougher rather than weaker regulation of his future insider activity. This is because regulation can reduce not only the expected benefits, but also the expected costs of insider status. Tough enough regulation can make the expected cost savings greater than the lost benefits and increase incentives to invest as an insider. Weaker regulation, in contrast, can be worse than no regulation in terms of these incentives.
机译：关于规范内幕交易的利弊之争正在进行中。通过证明投资者可能更倾向于对自己未来的内幕活动进行更强硬的监管，我们为这场辩论做出了贡献。这是因为监管不仅可以减少预期利益，而且可以减少内部人员身份的预期成本。足够严格的法规可以使预期的成本节省大于损失的利益，并增加作为内部人员进行投资的动机。相比之下，就这些激励而言，较弱的监管可能比没有监管更糟糕。

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