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Intergovernmental transfers and re-election concerned politicians

机译：政府间转移和连任有关政治人物

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摘要

This paper provides a non-partisan rationale for intergovernmental transfers: transfers are generated by electoral dynamics and term limits. We formally study re-election concerned politicians in a federal setting with term limits. The theory presented highlights an important aspect of federalism, that voters participate in elections for office holders at multiple levels of government. We augment a standard model of political career concerns to allow for multilevel governance, and to provide a central office holder with the ability to make transfers to a local politician. We find that when elections are staggered, an equilibrium exists with positive transfers. These transfers are made to sabotage political challengers. These transfers are non-partisan and are an artifact of the electoral dynamics as generated by the electoral calendar and politicians' career concerns. We test the implications of the theory using data on transfer receipts of U.S. governors, confirming the importance of election timing and term limits as determinants of transfers.
机译：本文提供了政府间转移支付的无党派理由：转移是由选举动态和任期限制产生的。我们在联邦任职期间正式研究与连任有关的政客，并设有任期限制。提出的理论强调了联邦制的一个重要方面，即选民参加了政府多个级别的公职人员选举。我们扩充了政治职业问题的标准模型，以允许进行多级治理，并为中央办公室负责人提供转移到当地政治人物的能力。我们发现，当选举错开时，存在正向转移的均衡。这些移交给了破坏政治挑战者。这些转移是无党派的，是选举动态和政客职业关注产生的选举动态的产物。我们使用有关美国州长调动收入的数据来检验该理论的含义，从而确认选举时机和任期限制作为调动决定因素的重要性。

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