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On the importance of inequality in politics: duplicate bills and bill co-sponsorship in the US House of Representatives

机译：关于政治中不平等的重要性：重复的法案和美国众议院的法案共同赞助

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摘要

In this paper, we attempt to provide an economic explanation for the adoption of bill co-sponsorship by the US House of Representatives in 1967. We demonstrate empirically that key features of legislative production prior to 1967 (when House members' support for a bill was indicated by introduction of duplicate bills) and post-1967 (when political support for a bill is indicated by co-sponsorship) are strikingly similar. Specifically, the raw number of supporters of a bill, whether indicated by duplicate bills or by co-sponsorship, is not nearly as critical to advancement of that bill through the House of Representatives as is the political power of the individual who introduces it and those who support it. The relative sizes of these effects are highly consistent over time. In effect, this finding means that the underlying factors of importance in the House's legislative production function did not change significantly when bill co-sponsorship was adopted. This suggests that the change in operating procedure may have been driven by an intra-chamber struggle to control the legislative outcomes. We present empirical evidence that is highly consistent with this hypothesis-adoption of bill co-sponsorship in 1967 coincides exactly with the post-World War II peak in a concentration ratio of legislation passed in the US House of Representatives. Prior to the 90th Congress, there was a more-or-less steady increase in concentration of legislation passed by the five busiest committees that peaked at over 0.4 in the 90th Congress and then declined precipitously to under 0.15 by the 93rd Congress.
机译：在本文中，我们试图为美国众议院在1967年通过法案共同赞助提供经济上的解释。我们通过经验证明，1967年之前立法生产的主要特征（当时众议院议员对法案的支持是并通过引入重复的法案来表示）和1967年后（当法案的政治支持由共同赞助表示时）极为相似。具体来说，无论是重复法案还是共同发起法案，法案支持者的原始人数对于通过众议院推进该法案的重要性都远不如提出该法案的个人和那些支持者的政治力量那么重要。谁支持它。这些影响的相对大小随时间高度一致。实际上，这一发现意味着，在采用法案共同提案制的情况下，在众议院立法生产职能中重要的基本因素没有显着变化。这表明，操作程序的变化可能是由于室内人为控制立法成果而进行的斗争所驱动的。我们提供的经验证据与这种假设-在1967年采用法案共同提案制高度一致-恰好与第二次世界大战后美国众议院通过的立法集中率相吻合。在第90届预防犯罪大会之前，五个最繁忙的委员会通过的立法集中程度或多或少稳定增长，在90届预防犯罪大会上达到0.4的峰值，然后在第93届预防犯罪大会上急剧下降到0.15以下。

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