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On the effects of incentive framing on bribery: evidence from an experiment in Burkina Faso

机译：关于激励框架对贿赂的影响：来自布基纳法索的一项实验的证据

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摘要

While incentive framing has been shown to promote workers' effort, little is known about how it affects other dimensions of the employer-employee relationship. This paper examines whether incentive framing can also influence workers propensity to engage in an activity disloyal to their employer: corruption. To do so, we conducted an experiment in which graders are offered a bribe to report a better grade. Three treatments are conducted by framing economically equivalent contracts as menus of bonuses, penalties, or bonuses and penalties. We find that graders are more corrupt when incentives are framed as a combination of bonuses and penalties, while no difference is found between the bonus and the penalty contracts. These results are inconsistent with both standard economic theory and labor reciprocity.
机译：尽管激励框架已经显示出可以促进工人的努力，但对其如何影响雇主与雇员关系的其他方面知之甚少。本文研究了激励框架是否还会影响工人从事不忠于其雇主的活动的倾向：腐败。为此，我们进行了一项实验，向年级学生行贿以报告更好的成绩。通过将经济上等价的合同作为奖金，罚金或奖金和罚金的菜单来制定三种处理方法。我们发现，如果奖励是奖金和罚金的结合，则评分者的腐败程度就会更高，而奖金和罚金合同之间并没有区别。这些结果与标准经济学理论和劳动互惠性均不一致。

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