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Determinants of property rights institutions: survey of literature and new evidence

机译：产权机构的决定因素：文献调查和新证据

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Why do some countries have better institutions than others? More specifically, what accounts for variation in the quality of property rights institutions in different countries? In this paper, I empirically assess four different theories relating to the determinants of property rights institutions: (1) the economic approach, which maintains that property rights institutions are created when the benefits of their creation exceed their costs; (2) the cultural approach, which stipulates that institutional variation reflects the differences in the beliefs of political leaders about what institutions create benefits for society; (3) the historical approach, which contends that cross-country differences in property rights institutions are the by-product of historical accidents; and (4) the political approach, which defends the premise that institutions are voluntarily chosen by the individuals who control political power, and these individuals choose institutions with the objective to maximize their personal payoffs rather than the benefits of the society as a whole. In order to test the veracity of these theories, I undertake a cross-sectional analysis of 142 countries (including 116 developing and 26 developed countries) over the period 1970-2005. The results of this analysis provide several interesting insights. Firstly, they indicate that the political approach appears to be the most relevant explanation for cross-country variation in property rights institutions: not only is this approach the most statistically robust,it also provides the best fit with the property rights index. The results of non-nested hypothesis test a la Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) confirm this analysis. Secondly, regardless of econometric specification and country sample, democracy is positively and significantly linked to property rights institutions. Thirdly, the data also reveal that while legal origin does significantly affect property rights institutions in developing countries, it appears to have no effect in developed countries. Fourthly, my analysis demonstrates that, in contrast to the full sample case, an increase in GDP per capita does not significantly contribute to the improvement in the quality of property rights institutions in Africa.
机译：为什么有些国家的机构比其他国家更好？更具体地说，是什么导致了不同国家产权机构质量的差异？在本文中，我从实证角度评估了与产权制度决定因素有关的四种不同理论：（1）经济方法，认为产权制度是在其创造的收益超过其成本时才创建的； （2）文化方法，它规定制度变迁反映出政治领导人关于什么制度为社会创造利益的信念的差异； （3）历史方法，认为产权制度的跨国差异是历史事故的副产品； （4）政治方法，它捍卫了这样一个前提，即制度是由控制政权的人自愿选择的，而这些人选择制度的目的是最大程度地提高个人收益，而不是整个社会的利益。为了检验这些理论的准确性，我在1970-2005年期间对142个国家（包括116个发展中国家和26个发达国家）进行了横断面分析。分析的结果提供了一些有趣的见解。首先，他们表明，政治方法似乎是产权制度中跨国变化的最相关解释：这种方法不仅统计上最稳健，而且也最适合产权指数。戴维森和麦金农（1981）的非嵌套假设检验结果证实了这一分析。其次，无论计量经济学规范和国家样本如何，民主与产权制度都有积极而显着的联系。第三，数据还表明，尽管法律渊源确实对发展中国家的产权制度产生了重大影响，但在发达国家似乎没有影响。第四，我的分析表明，与整个抽样案例相比，人均国内生产总值的增长对非洲产权制度质量的改善没有显着贡献。

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