首页> 外文期刊>Economics of governance >Fiscal restraints by advisors
【24h】

Fiscal restraints by advisors

机译:顾问的财政约束

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

This study investigates the role of fiscal advisors in maintaining government fiscal discipline when the advisor's appointment is determined endogenously. Our theoretical model shows that an incumbent politician has an incentive to employ an external advisor as a commitment device for fiscal discipline before being aware of his own competence level. The advisor acts as a restraint on public expenditure, which works to control the incumbent politician's ex post overspending to buy votes. Our empirical analysis supports this hypothesis in the Japanese case where governments with directors from the central government tend to spend less.
机译:本研究调查内生确定顾问的任命时,财政顾问在维持政府财政纪律方面的作用。我们的理论模型表明,现任政治家在意识到自己的能力水平之前,有动机聘用外部顾问作为财政纪律的承诺工具。顾问限制了公共开支,从而控制了现任政治家事后购买票的超支。在日本的情况下,我们的经验分析支持了这一假设,在这种情况下,由中央政府领导的政府往往支出较少。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号