A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem

Karpov Alexander

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A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem

机译：稳定婚姻匹配问题中唯一性一致性的充要条件

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摘要

The paper develops a new extension of the sequential preference condition, which leads to unique stable matching in all subpopulations, obtained by consistent restrictions of the marriage matching problem. Under the new condition, the Gale-Shapley algorithm is stable, consistent, strategy-proof, Pareto optimal for men, and Pareto optimal for women. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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《Economics letters》 |2019年第5期|63-65|共3页
作者
Karpov Alexander;
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作者单位

Natl Res Univ Higher Sch Econ 20 Myasnitskaya Str Moscow 10100 Russia|Russian Acad Sci Inst Control Sci 65 Projsoyuznaya Str Moscow 117997 Russia;

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正文语种 eng
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关键词
Market partition paradox; Stability; Consistency; Interrupter;

机译：市场分割悖论;稳定性;一致性;灭弧室;

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专利

1. Comment on 'On the Uniqueness of Stable Marriage Matchings' [Economic Letters 69(1):1-8,2000] [J] . Mario E. Consuegra, Rajnish Kumar, Giri Narasimhan Economics letters . 2013,第3期

机译：评论“关于稳定婚姻搭配的独特性” [经济快报69（1）：1-8,2000]
2. A Note on the Uniqueness of Stable Marriage Matching [J] . Ewa Drgas-Burchardt Discussiones Mathematicae Graph Theory . 2013,第1期

机译：关于稳定婚姻匹配的独特性的说明
3. The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems [J] . Peter Biro, Katarina Cechlarova, Tamas Fleiner International Journal of Game Theory . 2008,第3a4期

机译：稳定婚姻和室友问题的稳定配对和半配对的动力学
4. Male Optimal and Unique Stable Marriages with Partially Ordered Preferences [C] . Mirco Gelain, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, International Workshop on Collaborative Agents - Research and Development . 2011

机译：男性最佳和独特的稳定婚姻，部分有序偏好
5. When do systematic gains uniquely determine the number of marriages between different types in the Choo-Siow matching model? Sufficient conditions for a unique equilibrium. [D] . Decker, Colin. 2010

机译：在Choo-Siow匹配模型中，系统收益何时唯一地确定不同类型之间的婚姻数？满足独特平衡的充分条件。
6. An unstable support surface is not a sufficient condition for increases in muscle activity during rehabilitation exercise [O] . Gregory J Lehman 2007

机译：不稳定的支撑表面不足以在康复运动中增加肌肉活动
7. When do systematic gains uniquely determine the number of marriages between different types in the Choo-Siow matching model? Sufficient conditions for a unique equilibrium [O] . Colin Decker, Robert J. McCann, Benjamin K. Stephens 2009

机译：系统性收益何时能够唯一地确定Choo-siow匹配模型中不同类型之间的婚姻数量？独特均衡的充分条件
8. Stable Matching in a Common Generalization of the Marriage and Assignment Models [R] . Eriksson, K., Karlander, J. 1997

机译：婚姻与作业模式共同概括中的稳定匹配

A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem

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