On the effects of bid caps in all-pay auctions

Chen Bo

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On the effects of bid caps in all-pay auctions

机译：关于出价帽对全薪拍卖的影响

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This paper analyzes the effects of a bid cap in an all-pay auction with incomplete information. I find that a non-trivial bid cap affects an agent's expected payment in three ways: An "anti-competition effect" which is associated with this agent's own signal, a pro-competitive "good news effect" which is associated with her opponents' signals and which alleviates the winner's curse, and an "inference effect" caused by affiliation of signals. Unlike the former two effects, the "inference effect" is a double-edged sword. It is anti-competitive when the cap is relatively low and pro-competitive when a cap is relatively high. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

机译：本文通过不完整信息分析了BID帽中的出价概率。我发现一个非琐碎的出价概率以三种方式影响代理人的预期付款：与此代理商自己的信号有关的“反竞争效果”，这是与对手相关的竞争激烈的“好消息”信号并减轻了胜利者的诅咒，以及由信号的隶属度引起的“推理效果”。与前两种影响不同，“推理效果”是一把双刃剑。当盖子相对较高时盖子相对较低，竞争时，它是反竞争激烈的。（c）2019 Elsevier B.v.保留所有权利。

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来源
《Economics letters》 |2019年第4期|60-65|共6页
作者
Chen Bo;
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作者单位

Shenzhen Univ Shenzhen Audencia Business Sch Shenzhen Peoples R China|Shenzhen Univ Coll Management Shenzhen Peoples R China|Wuhan Univ Econ & Management Sch Wuhan Hubei Peoples R China|King Fahd Univ Petr & Minerals KFUPM Business Sch Dhahran Saudi Arabia;

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正文语种 eng
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关键词
All-pay auction; Interdependent valuation; Affiliation; Bid cap;

机译：全薪拍卖;相互依存估值;隶属度;出价帽;

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专利

1. On the effects of bid caps in all-pay auctions [J] . Chen Bo Economics letters . 2019,第APRa期

机译：关于全额竞价中的出价上限的影响
2. Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry [J] . Chen Bo, Ma Lijun, Zhu Zhaobo, Economics letters . 2020,第Jana期

机译：具有出价上限和随机入场的全薪拍卖的披露政策
3. Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps [J] . Einy Ezra, Haimanko Ori, Orzach Ram, International Journal of Game Theory . 2016,第1a2期

机译：具有不对称信息和出价上限的共值全薪拍卖
4. Revelation strategies in all-pay auctions with an uncertain number of bidders [C] . Erqin Hu, Yong Zhao, Yi Huang Chinese Automation Congress . 2015

机译：竞标者数量不确定的全薪拍卖的启示策略
5. A COMMON VALUE AUCTION MODEL ALLOWING ASYMMETRICALLY INFORMED BIDDERS, RISK AVERSE BIDDERS, AND A COMPARISON OF SEQUENTIAL VERSUS SIMULTANEOUS AUCTIONS FOR MULTIPLE OBJECTS (APPLIED GAME THEORY, INFORMATION ECONOMICS). [D] . HAUSCH, DONALD BRUCE. 1985

机译：一个允许不对称信息的投标者，风险厌恶的投标者以及多个对象的顺序对同时拍卖的比较的共值拍卖模型（应用博弈论，信息经济学）。
6. Rationality, Irrationality and Escalating Behavior in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions [O] . Filippo Radicchi, Andrea Baronchelli, Luís A. N. Amaral 2009

机译：最低唯一竞标中的合理性，非理性和行为升级
7. Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants: An experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions [O] . Llorente-Saguer Aniol, Sheremeta Roman M., Szech Nora 2016

机译：设计异质参赛者之间的竞赛：对全薪竞价中的抢七和竞价上限的实验研究

On the effects of bid caps in all-pay auctions

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