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Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets: A test for ex ante moral hazard revisited

机译:保险市场信息不对称测试:重新审视事前道德风险测试

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摘要

The disentanglement of adverse selection from ex ante moral hazard remains an empirical challenge. Our comment dissects a natural experiment proposed by Chiappori and Salanie (2000) to test for ex ante moral hazard. Firstly, we argue that their test, as proposed, is too simple and too general to enable reliable inferences about the existence of ex ante moral hazard to be drawn and the reported negative coefficient does not rule out moral hazard. Secondly, their analysis strongly suggests that their proposed instrument (inherited bonus mitts) is endogenously determined and therefore does not satisfy the technical requirements of a natural experiment. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:逆向选择与先验道德风险脱节仍然是一个经验挑战。我们的评论剖析了Chiappori和Salanie(2000)提出的自然实验,以测试事前的道德风险。首先,我们认为,他们提出的检验过于简单和笼统,以致无法得出关于事前道德风险存在的可靠推断,而且所报道的负系数也不能排除道德风险。其次,他们的分析强烈表明,他们提出的工具(继承的手套)是内在确定的,因此不能满足自然实验的技术要求。 (C)2016 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Economics letters》 |2017年第1期|4-5|共2页
  • 作者单位

    Univ Queensland, Ctr Business & Econ Hlth, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia;

    Queensland Univ Technol, Inst Hlth & Biomed Innovat, Brisbane, Qld 4001, Australia;

    Univ Queensland, Ctr Business & Econ Hlth, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia|Univ Queensland, Fac Hlth & Behav Sci, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Moral hazard; Natural experiment;

    机译:道德风险;自然实验;

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