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A continuum of commitment

机译:连续的承诺

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We examine a generic three-stage game for two players with alternating moves, where the first player can choose the level of adjustment cost to be paid in the last period to modify the action she announced in the first period. In the resulting continuum of commitment options, convexifying the choice between first-mover and second-mover advantage in pure strategies, we characterize when an intermediate adjustment-cost level is chosen in equilibrium. We show that the wastefulness of the adjustment cost may be in the players' best interest, improving both of their individual net payoffs over making any fraction of the adjustment cost a side-payment from the first to the second player.
机译:我们研究了具有两个交替动作的两个玩家的通用三阶段游戏,其中第一个玩家可以选择在最后一个时期内要支付的调整费用水平,以修改她在第一个时期内宣布的动作。在由此产生的承诺选择的连续性中,凸显了纯策略中先行者优势与后进者优势之间的选择,我们表征了均衡中选择中间调整成本水平时的情况。我们表明,调整成本的浪费可能符合参与者的最佳利益,与将调整成本的任何部分从第一参与者到第二参与者的边际支付相比,改善了他们各自的净收益。

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