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Analyzing Effects of Generation Limits on the Equilibrium in the Electricity Markets

机译：分析发电限制对电力市场均衡的影响

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This article considers a game theoretic situation for an analysis of electricity spot markets modeled by uniform price auctions. The properties of equilibrium in the electricity spot markets are analyzed and the effects of generation limits on the equilibrium are analytically explored. Generation firms, which are supposed to maximize their profits through optimal bidding strategies, submit their generation offers in the form of sealed bid and the markets operate as uniform price auctions. Generation quantities allocated to individual firms and market clearing prices, which determine profits of generation firms, are affected by their bidding strategies and strategic interactions among generation firms as well. In this article, two market situations are considered. In the first situation, unconstrained market condition is considered. No generation quantity of firms is binding on its maximum limit. In the other situation, constrained market condition is dealt with. The generation quantity of generation firms is constrained to its limit and the variation of market equilibriums are analytically examined. For both cases, best responses of the individual firms and consequent optimal bidding strategies at equilibriums are analytically derived. Finally, effects of generation limits upon market equilibriums are investigated, focused on the variation of market equilibriums which is resulted from the strategic behaviors of generation firms. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is provided to show the basic idea of the proposed method.
机译：本文考虑了一种博弈论的情况，用于分析以统一价格拍卖为模型的电力现货市场。分析了电力现货市场中均衡的性质，并分析了发电极限对均衡的影响。应当通过最佳竞标策略使利润最大化的发电公司以密封投标的形式提交发电报价，而市场则以统一的价格拍卖方式运作。分配给单个公司的发电量和市场结算价格确定了发电公司的利润，它们的投标策略以及发电公司之间的战略互动也对其产生影响。在本文中，考虑了两种市场情况。在第一种情况下，考虑不受限制的市场条件。企业的发电量没有最大限制。在其他情况下，则要处理受限制的市场条件。发电企业的发电量被限制在其极限内，并且分析了市场均衡的变化。对于这两种情况，都可以分析得出各个公司的最佳响应以及由此产生的均衡状态下的最优竞标策略。最后，研究了发电限制对市场均衡的影响，重点研究了发电公司的战略行为导致的市场均衡变化。提供了一个具有两代公司的简单数值示例，以显示该方法的基本思想。

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