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首页> 外文期刊>Electronic commerce research and applications >Mechanism design for e-procurement auctions: On the efficacy of post-auction negotiation and quality effort incentives
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Mechanism design for e-procurement auctions: On the efficacy of post-auction negotiation and quality effort incentives

机译：电子采购拍卖的机制设计：论拍卖后谈判的有效性和质量努力激励

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摘要

Practical mechanisms for procurement involve bidding, negotiation, transfer payments and subsidies, and the possibility of verification of unobservable product and service quality. We model two proposed multistage procurement mechanisms. One focuses on the auction price that is established, and the other emphasizes price negotiation. Both also emphasize quality and offer incentives for the unobservable level of a supplier's effort, while addressing the buyer's satisfaction. Our results show that, with the appropriate incentive, which we will refer to as a quality effort bonus, the supplier will exert more effort to supply higher quality goods or services after winning the procurement auction. We also find that a mechanism incorporating price and quality negotiation improves the supply chain's surplus and generates the possibility of Pareto optimal improvement in comparison to a mechanism that emphasizes the auction price only. From the buyer's perspective though, either mechanism can dominate the other, depending on the circumstances of procurement. Thus, post-auction negotiation may not always be optimal for the buyer, although it always produces first-best goods or service quality outcomes. The buyer's choice between mechanisms will be influenced by different values of the quality effort bonus. For managers in practice, our analysis shows that it is possible to simplify the optimization procedure by using a new approach for selecting the appropriate mechanism and determining what value of the incentive for the supplier makes sense.
机译：实际的采购机制包括招标，谈判，转移付款和补贴，以及验证无法观察到的产品和服务质量的可能性。我们对两个提议的多阶段采购机制进行建模。一个侧重于确定的拍卖价格，另一个侧重于价格协商。两者都强调质量，并为供应商付出的努力提供了可观的激励，同时解决了买方的满意度。我们的结果表明，在适当的激励措施（我们将其称为质量努力奖金）下，供应商在赢得采购拍卖后将付出更多的努力来提供更高质量的商品或服务。我们还发现，与仅强调拍卖价格的机制相比，包含价格和质量协商的机制可以改善供应链的过剩状况，并产生帕累托最优改善的可能性。但是，从买方的角度来看，取决于采购的情况，任何一种机制都可以主导另一种机制。因此，尽管拍卖后谈判总是产生最优质的商品或服务质量结果，但对于买方而言，不一定总是最优的。购买者在机制之间的选择将受到质量努力奖金的不同值的影响。对于实践中的管理人员，我们的分析表明，可以通过使用一种新的方法来选择合适的机制并确定对供应商的激励价值有意义，从而简化优化过程。

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