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Comparison between the agency and wholesale model under the e-book duopoly market

机译：电子书双寡头垄断市场下代理与批发模式的比较

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摘要

This paper provides a comprehensive comparison between the agency and wholesale model under the electronic book market duopoly. A model comprised of two retailers and a publisher was established to run the comparison in terms of price, profit, and welfare. We found that although better e-reader offerings may seem favorable in terms of e-book pricing, the actual effect on e-books is limited or even negligible. High wholesale price leads to higher retail prices of e-books and e-readers under the wholesale model than the agency model. Generally speaking, the total profits of e-books returned to the retailers under the wholesale model are lower than those returned under the agency model; conversely, the publisher obtains higher profits under the wholesale model than the agency model despite its power over e-book pricing. We also found that consumers are more likely to derive greater surplus under the wholesale model when the difference in available e-books is relatively narrow. If the wholesale price is low, however, the consumer surplus under the wholesale model is higher than that under the agency model across the board. Further, when the difference in e-books is very small, the total social welfare is minimized under the wholesale model compared to the agency model; low wholesale price but poor substitutability (or high wholesale price with relatively high substitutability) yield favorable social welfare under the wholesale model.
机译：本文对电子书市场双头垄断下的代理模式与批发模式进行了全面的比较。建立了一个由两个零售商和一个发行者组成的模型，以进行价格，利润和福利方面的比较。我们发现，尽管就电子书定价而言，更好的电子阅读器产品看似有利，但对电子书的实际影响是有限的，甚至可以忽略不计。批发价格较高导致批发模式下的电子书和电子阅读器的零售价格高于代理模式。一般而言，批发模式下退还给零售商的电子书的总利润低于代理模式下退还的书；相反，尽管发行商具有电子书定价的权力，但在批发模式下获得的利润要比代理机构下的利润高。我们还发现，当可用电子书的差异相对较小时，在批发模式下，消费者更有可能获得更大的剩余。但是，如果批发价格较低，则批发模式下的消费者剩余将高于整体代理模式下的消费者剩余。此外，当电子书的差异很小时，与代理模式相比，批发模式下的总社会福利最小化；批发价格低但可替代性差（或具有较高可替代性的高批发价格）在批发模式下产生了良好的社会福利。

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