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Power Analysis and Countermeasure of RSA Cryptosystem

机译:RSA密码系统的功耗分析及对策

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摘要

Public-key cryptography such as RSA cryptography and elliptic curve cryptography are used in electronic transactions. Since the security of the cryptography depends on the cryptographic key which is stored on an IC chip, security was believed to have been established as long as we use smart cards. However, since the mid-1990s, one technique after another has been developed for extracting the secret key without unsealing the IC chip. In particular, the power analysis by Kocher's group is an attack that can be carried out by using practical resources, and various applications have been proposed. In this paper, we study the power analysis of modular exponentiation, which is a primitive of RSA cryptography, and its countermeasures. Specifically, starting with the countermeasures to single-exponent multiple-data (SEMD), multiple-exponent single-data (MESD), and zero-exponent multiple-data (ZEMD) attacks of Messerges's group, we illustrate feasible attacks such as the Big Mac attack of Walter and Thompson, the template attack of Chari's group, and an attack proposed by the authors. We propose a countermeasure and present an implementation in a smart card. If the proposed method is applied to 1024-bit modular exponentiation, adequate security can be obtained in a processing lime less than twice the time without countermeasures.
机译:电子交易中使用诸如RSA密码学和椭圆曲线密码学之类的公钥密码学。由于加密技术的安全性取决于存储在IC芯片上的加密密钥,因此,只要我们使用智能卡,就可以相信已经建立了安全性。然而,自1990年代中期以来,已经开发出一种接另一种技术来提取秘密密钥而不打开IC芯片。尤其是,科赫(Kocher)小组的力量分析是一种可以通过使用实际资源进行的攻击,并且已经提出了各种应用。在本文中,我们研究了作为RSA密码学原始语言的模幂的幂分析及其对策。具体来说,从针对Messerges小组的单指数多数据(SEMD),多指数单数据(MESD)和零指数多数据(ZEMD)攻击的对策开始,我们说明了可行的攻击,例如Big Mac攻击Walter和Thompson,Chari小组的模板攻击,以及作者提出的攻击。我们提出了对策并提出了智能卡中的实现。如果将所提出的方法应用于1024位模块化幂运算,则可以在处理时间不到两倍的处理石灰中获得足够的安全性而无需采取对策。

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