• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Emerging Markets Finance & Trade >Insider Ownership, Subsidiary Cash Holdings, and Economic Consequences: Evidence from Listed Chinese Companies
【24h】

Insider Ownership, Subsidiary Cash Holdings, and Economic Consequences: Evidence from Listed Chinese Companies

机译：内部人所有权，子公司现金控股和经济后果：来自中国上市公司的证据

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Using a large sample of listed Chinese companies, we investigate how the equity ownership of business group insiders affects subsidiary cash holdings. We find that ownership by the largest shareholders and senior managers in the listed parent firm is negatively related to its subsidiaries' cash holdings, whereas there is a positive relationship with minority equity in subsidiaries. We also find that the market places a more significant value discount on listed firms whose cash holdings are more located in the affiliated subsidiaries. Our evidence demonstrates how cash policy inside business groups is influenced by insider ownership, and it reveals to what extent cash allocated in subsidiaries may suffer from losses in efficiency.
机译：我们使用大量的中国上市公司样本，研究了企业内部人士的股权如何影响子公司的现金持有量。我们发现，上市母公司的最大股东和高级管理人员的所有权与其子公司的现金持有量负相关，而与子公司的少数股权则存在正相关关系。我们还发现，市场对现金持有量更多位于关联子公司中的上市公司具有更大的价值折扣。我们的证据表明，企业集团内部的现金政策如何受到内部人所有权的影响，并揭示了分配给子公司的现金可能在多大程度上遭受效率损失。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号