Executive compensation incentives, risk level and corporate innovation

Zhou Bing; Li Yu-meng; Sun Fang-cheng; Zhou Zhong-guo

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Executive compensation incentives, risk level and corporate innovation

机译：执行薪酬奖励，风险等级和企业创新

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This paper explores the innovation of Chinese listed companies from the perspectives of CEOs' compensation and corporate risk. We find that executives' salary can effectively promote firms' investment in research and development (R&D), while equity compensation failed to promote corporate R&D investment. Besides, the level of corporate risk has a mediating effect between executives' salary and corporate R&D investment. However, corporate risk level has a moderating effect between equity compensation and corporate R&D investment. When the level of risk is higher than a certain level, the negative impact of executives' equity compensation on innovation input becomes more obvious.

机译：本文从首席执行官赔偿和企业风险的角度探讨了中国上市公司的创新。我们发现高管薪酬可以有效地促进公司对研发的投资（研发），而股权赔偿未能促进企业研发投资。此外，企业风险水平在高管薪酬与企业研发投资之间具有调解效果。但是，企业风险水平在股权赔偿和企业研发投资之间具有更高的效果。当风险水平高于一定程度时，高管对创新投入的权益补偿的负面影响变得更加明显。

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来源
《Emerging markets review》 |2021年第6期|100798.1-100798.16|共16页
作者
Zhou Bing; Li Yu-meng; Sun Fang-cheng; Zhou Zhong-guo;
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作者单位

Chongqing Technol & Business Univ Res Ctr Econ Upper Reaches Yangtse River Sch Accounting Chongqing 400067 Peoples R China;

Chongqing Technol & Business Univ Res Ctr Econ Upper Reaches Yangtse River Sch Accounting Chongqing 400067 Peoples R China;

Chongqing Technol & Business Univ Res Ctr Econ Upper Reaches Yangtse River Sch Accounting Chongqing 400067 Peoples R China;

Calif State Univ David Nazarian Coll Business & Econ Dept Finance Financial Planning & Insurance Northridge CA 91330 USA;

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正文语种 eng
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Executive compensation incentives; Corporate risk level; Corporate innovation;

机译：执行赔偿奖励措施;企业风险等级;企业创新;

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机译：基于多元回归模型的R＆D补贴和执行薪酬激励措施对企业研发投资的影响研究 - 以上市的药品制造公司为例
5. Executive incentives and corporate decisions: The risk management channel. [D] . Skog, Jeremy. 2009

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6. HIV and risk behaviour: Risk compensation: the Achilles heel of innovations in HIV prevention? [O] . Michael M Cassell, Daniel T Halperin, James D Shelton, 2006

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7. The endogenous character of executive compensation: Does corporate strategy affect the choice to adopt residual income-based incentives? [O] . Sonneveld F.V. (Frank) 2009

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Executive compensation incentives, risk level and corporate innovation

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