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Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the EMU when cyclical conditions are uncertain

机译:当不确定周期性条件时,欧洲货币联盟中的货币和财政政策互动

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This paper examines economic policy interactions in the Economic and Monetary Union when the assessment of cyclical conditions in real time is surrounded by uncertainty. On the basis of a simple stylised model it shows that with a Nash-type of interaction different views about the output gap on the side of the policy players—the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Central Bank—can give rise to excessive activism with policy players pushing economic variables into opposite directions. It argues that the costs of such policy conflicts can be reduced by agreeing on a common assessment of the cycle, by constraining policy variables, and/or by increasing the weight of fiscally conservative institutions. An alternative option to sidestep policy conflicts ensuing from diverging views of the cycle is to take policy decisions sequentially, as is the case in a Stackelberg-type of interaction. The paper shows that for a given misperception of the cycle, the impact on the policy instruments and on output and inflation are generally smaller in the Stackelberg equilibrium as compared to a Nash outcome. Alternative allocations of roles—that is leader versus follower—are discussed and assessed.
机译:当实时的周期性状况评估被不确定性包围时,本文研究了经济与货币联盟中的经济政策互动。在一个简单的程式化模型的基础上,它表明,采用纳什(Nash)类型的互动,对于政策制定者方面的产出缺口,欧洲联盟委员会,欧洲委员会和欧洲中央银行,可以有不同的看法由于政策参与者将经济变量推向相反的方向,导致过度的积极主义。它认为,可以通过就周期的共同评估达成共识,限制政策变量和/或增加财政保守机构的权重,来减少此类政策冲突的成本。避免因周期的不同观点而导致的政策冲突的另一种选择是按顺序进行政策决策,就像Stackelberg类型的互动一样。该论文表明,对于给定的周期误解,与纳什结果相比,Stackelberg均衡对政策工具,产出和通货膨胀的影响通常较小。讨论并评估了角色的替代分配(即领导者与跟随者)。

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