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Incentive mechanisms to promote energy efficiency programs in power distribution companies

机译：促进配电公司提高能效计划的激励机制

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Power distribution companies (DISCOs) play an important role in promoting energy efficiency (hereafter EE), mainly due to the fact that they have detailed information regarding their clients' consumption patterns. However, under the traditional regulatory framework, DISCOs have disincentives to promote EE, due to the fact that a reduction in sales also means a reduction in their revenues and profits. Most regulatory policies encouraging EE have some embedded payment schemes that allow financing EE programs. In this paper, we focus on these EE-programs' payment schemes that are embedded into the regulatory policies. Specifically, this paper studies two models of the Principal-Agent bi-level type in order to analyze the economic effects of implementing different payment schemes to foster EE in DISCOs. The main difference between each model is that uncertainty in energy savings is considered by the electricity regulatory institution in only one of the models. In terms of the results, it is observed that, in general terms, it is more convenient for the regulator to adopt a performance-based incentive mechanism than a payment scheme financing only the fixed costs of implementing EE programs. However, if the electricity regulatory institution seeks a higher level of minimum expected utility, it is optimal to adopt a mixed system of compensation, which takes into account the fixed cost compensation and performance-based incentive payments. (c) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：配电公司（DISCO）在提高能源效率（以下简称EE）方面起着重要作用，这主要是因为配电公司拥有有关其客户消费模式的详细信息。但是，在传统的监管框架下，DISCO不利于推广EE，原因是销售量的减少也意味着收入和利润的减少。大多数鼓励EE的法规政策都有一些嵌入式支付计划，可以为EE项目提供资金。在本文中，我们重点关注嵌入在监管政策中的这些EE计划的付款方案。具体而言，本文研究了委托-代理两级类型的两个模型，以分析实施不同的支付计划以促进DISCO中的EE的经济影响。每种模型之间的主要区别在于，电力监管机构仅在其中一种模型中考虑了节能的不确定性。从结果来看，可以发现，总的来说，与仅为实施电子电气项目的固定成本融资的支付方案相比，监管机构采用基于绩效的激励机制更为方便。但是，如果电力监管机构寻求更高水平的最低预期效用，则最好采用混合补偿制度，其中要考虑到固定成本补偿和基于绩效的奖励金。 （c）2015 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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