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Incentive policies for prefabrication implementation of real estate enterprises: An evolutionary game theory-based analysis

机译：房地产企业预制实施的激励政策：进化博弈论的分析

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摘要

Prefabrication construction method has been considered an effective way for enhancing the environmental performance and sustainable development of the construction industry. Many countries have imposed policies to stimulate the implementation of prefabrication. However, the efficiency of the incentive policies in China did not turn out as expected because of the existing benefit game between real estate enterprises and the government under the influence of consumers' purchasing intention. An evolutionary game model was established on the basis of 16 variables influencing the strategy selection of game players for determining the effective incentive policies. The interaction effect of the two players' behaviours was discussed. Four probable scenarios of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) exist in the game. However, the probabilities of "Incentive" from the government and "Implement" from real estate enterprises depend on the values of the 16 variables. The simulation of the evolutionary system was conducted to analyze the critical variables influencing the game. The increase of reputational incentives, financial incentives, the acceptance level of consumers and penalty and the reduction of additional costs can speed up the achievement of ESS between the government and real estate enterprises. Incentive policies should focus not only on real estate enterprises but also on consumers, manufacturers of prefabricated components and contractors.
机译：预制施工方法被认为是提高建筑业环境绩效和可持续发展的有效途径。许多国家施加了刺激预制措施的政策。然而，由于房地产企业与政府在消费者采购意图的影响下，中国激励政策的效率并未被预期。在16个变量的基础上建立了一种进化的游戏模型，影响了游戏玩家的战略选择，以确定有效的激励政策。讨论了两名球员行为的互动效应。游戏中存在四种进化稳定战略（ESS）的可能的四种可能的情景。然而，来自房地产企业的政府和“实施”的“激励”的概率取决于16个变量的价值。进行了进化系统的模拟，分析了影响游戏的临界变量。声誉激励措施的增加，财务激励，消费者接受程度和罚款以及减少额外成本可以加快政府和房地产企业之间的成就。激励政策不仅关注房地产企业，还应侧重于消费者，预制组件和承包商的制造商。

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  • 来源
    《Energy Policy》 |2021年第9期|112434.1-112434.12|共12页
  • 作者

    Wang Jun; Qin Yanjun; Zhou Jingyang;

  • 作者单位

    China Univ Petr Sch Econ & Management Qingdao 266580 Peoples R China|China Univ Petr Inst Energy Econ & Policy Qingdao 266580 Peoples R China;

    China Univ Petr Sch Econ & Management Qingdao 266580 Peoples R China|China Univ Petr Inst Energy Econ & Policy Qingdao 266580 Peoples R China;

    Shandong Jianzhu Univ Sch Management Engn Jinan 250100 Peoples R China;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);美国《工程索引》(EI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Sustainable development; Prefabrication; Incentive policy; Policy efficiency; Evolutionary game;

    机译：可持续发展;预制;激励政策;政策效率;进化游戏;

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