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The split incentives energy efficiency problem: Evidence of underinvestment by landlords

机译：分散激励的能效问题：业主投资不足的证据

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摘要

Due to asymmetric information between landlords and renters, landlords with tenants who pay the utility bill underinvest in energy efficiency measures. Using data from the 2009 Residential Energy Consumption Survey, I present empirical evidence that this underinvestment occurs in multiple categories of residential energy efficiency: space-heating, water-heating, window thickness, insulation, and weatherization. Because these landlords did not invest at the same rate as homeowners and landlords who pay the energy bill, their tenants' energy bill was higher by nearly 2%. When combined with other researchers' estimations for appliances (Davis, 2010), insulation, and thermostat responsiveness for tenants (Gillingham et al., 2012), our results imply that renters use approximately 2.7% more energy overall due to the landlord-tenant split incentive issue.
机译：由于房东与房客之间的信息不对称，因此房东和房客在支付水电费时对能源效率措施的投资不足。利用2009年住宅能耗调查的数据，我提供了经验证据，表明这种投资不足发生在住宅能源效率的多个类别中：空间供暖，水加热，窗户厚度，隔热和耐气候性。由于这些房东的投资额与房主和房东所支付的能源费用不同，因此其房客的能源费用高出将近2％。结合其他研究人员对设备的评估（戴维斯，2010年），隔热性和对租户的恒温响应（Gillingham等人，2012年），我们的结果表明，由于房东与租户的分裂，房客的能耗总体上增加了约2.7％。激励问题。

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