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Consignment auctions of free emissions allowances

机译：拍卖免费排放配额

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摘要

While the initial distribution of emissions allowances is usually thought to be independent of the emissions outcome, free allocation can affect the efficiency and fairness of allowance trading. Inefficiency may result from thin allowance markets, poor price discovery, and regulatory or organizational complexities that hinder the recognition of opportunity costs. Concerns about fairness may result from intransparency in the process of transferring substantial allowance value. We explore the role of consignment auctions in mitigating these concerns. These revenue-neutral auctions return the financial value of allowances to their original holders while revealing prices and directing allowances to their highest-valued use. They also can be used to support a minimum price when allowances are freely distributed, which may facilitate program linkage. Consignment auctions have minimal administrative costs and do not necessarily involve government. Experience indicates that they can play an important role, especially in new markets.
机译：通常认为排放配额的初始分配与排放结果无关，但自由分配会影响配额交易的效率和公平性。效率低下可能是由于配额市场薄弱，价格发现不力以及监管或组织的复杂性阻碍了机会成本的确认。对公平性的担心可能是由于转移大量备抵价值的过程中的不透明性造成的。我们探讨了寄售拍卖在缓解这些担忧中的作用。这些与收益无关的拍卖将配额的财务价值返还给原始持有人，同时揭示价格并将配额用于其最高价值的用途。当配额自由分配时，它们还可以用来支持最低价格，这可以促进程序链接。寄售拍卖的行政成本极低，并且不一定涉及政府。经验表明，它们可以发挥重要作用，尤其是在新市场中。

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