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首页> 外文期刊>Energy Policy >Competition, Regulation, And Pricing Behaviour In The Spanish Retail Gasoline Market
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Competition, Regulation, And Pricing Behaviour In The Spanish Retail Gasoline Market

机译：西班牙零售汽油市场中的竞争，法规和定价行为

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The restructuring of the Spanish oil industry produced a highly concentrated oligopoly in the retail gasoline market. In June 1990, the Spanish government introduced a system of ceiling price regulation in order to ensure that "liberalization" was accompanied by adequate consumer protection. By 1998, prices were left to the "free" market. This paper examines the pricing behaviour of the retail gasoline market using multivariate error correction models over the period January 1993 (abolishment of the state monopoly)-December 2004. The results suggest that gasoline retail prices respond symmetrically to increases as well as to decreases in the spot price of gasoline both over the period of price regulation (January 1993-September 1998) and over the period of free market (October 1998-December 2004). However, once the ceiling price regulation was abolished, cooperation emerged between the government and the major operators, Repsol-YPF and Cepsa-Elf, to control the inflation rate. This resulted in a slower rate of adjustment of gasoline retail prices when gasoline spot prices went up, as compared with the European pattern. Finally, the Spanish retail margin was by the end of our timing period of analysis, as in the starting years after the abolishment of the state monopoly, above the European average. This pattern confirms our political economic hypothesis, which suggests that the Spanish government and the oil companies were working together in reducing the inflation, in periods of rising oil and gasoline prices. It is also inferred that explaining the pricing pattern in energy markets may require different hypothesis than the classical perspective, involving just firms taking advantage of market power.
机译：西班牙石油工业的重组在零售汽油市场上产生了高度集中的寡头垄断。 1990年6月，西班牙政府引入了最高价格管制制度，以确保“自由化”伴随有足够的消费者保护。到1998年，价格留给了“免费”市场。本文使用多元误差校正模型研究了1993年1月（国家垄断的废除）至2004年12月期间零售汽油市场的定价行为。结果表明，汽油零售价格对汽油零售价格的上升和下降做出对称的反应。价格管制时期（1993年1月至1998年9月）和自由市场时期（1998年10月至2004年12月）的汽油现货价格。但是，一旦取消了最高价格规定，政府与主要运营商Repsol-YPF和Cepsa-Elf之间便出现了合作以控制通货膨胀率。与欧洲模式相比，当汽油现货价格上涨时，导致汽油零售价格的调整速度变慢。最终，西班牙的零售利润率在我们分析的时机结束时，就像在取消国家垄断之后的最初几年一样，高于欧洲平均水平。这种模式证实了我们的政治经济学假设，即在油价和汽油价格上涨期间，西班牙政府和石油公司正在共同努力降低通货膨胀。还可以推断，解释能源市场中的定价模式可能需要与经典观点不同的假设，即仅涉及利用市场力量的公司。

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