...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Energy >Evolutionary game analysis on local governments and manufacturers' behavioral strategies: Impact of phasing out subsidies for new energy vehicles
【24h】

Evolutionary game analysis on local governments and manufacturers' behavioral strategies: Impact of phasing out subsidies for new energy vehicles

机译：地方政府和制造商行为策略的演化博弈分析：逐步淘汰新能源汽车补贴的影响

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This paper discusses how to promote stable new energy vehicle (NEV) diffusion and how to alleviate the related financial pressure faced by governments. First, indirect evolutionary game theory is applied to examine the interaction mechanism of complex behaviors between local governments and auto manufactures, with and without consideration of subsidy policy phase-outs. Second, we define the ideal event and analyze the impacts of key factors on the dynamic evolution process. On this basis, the empirical analysis method is used to verify the game models and primary conclusions. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of selected parameters is discussed in details. Results demonstrate that: (1) subsidy policy phase-outs can help to develop the NEV industry; (2) the probability of an ideal event is positively correlated with the vehicle purchase tax, additional benefits for NEV manufacturers, penalties for fossil vehicle manufacturers and the coverage ratio of public charging piles, and it is negatively correlated with the phase-out rate; (3) NEV evolutionary dynamic factors can be divided into three priority levels and optimization of the parameters design is discussed, which can provide useful decision-making tools for governments and enterprises.
机译：本文讨论了如何促进稳定的新能源汽车（NEV）扩散，以及如何减轻政府面临的相关财务压力。首先，在不考虑补贴政策逐步取消的情况下，运用间接进化博弈理论研究了地方政府与汽车制造商之间复杂行为的相互作用机制。其次，我们定义理想事件并分析关键因素对动态演变过程的影响。在此基础上，运用实证分析方法对博弈模型和主要结论进行了验证。最后，详细讨论了所选参数的敏感性分析。结果表明：（1）逐步取消补贴政策有助于新能源汽车产业的发展； （2）理想事件发生的可能性与车辆购置税，新能源汽车制造商的额外利益，化石车辆制造商的罚款和公共充电桩的覆盖率呈正相关，与淘汰率呈负相关； （3）NEV演化动态因子可分为三个优先级，并讨论了参数设计的优化，可为政府和企业提供有用的决策工具。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号