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International R&D formations and strategic environmental policy

机译:国际研发形成和战略环境政策

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We examine relations between strategic environmental policy, international R&D cartels and research joint ventures (RJVs), using a third-country model with Cournot duopoly. We indicate that forming an R&D/RJV cartel reduces governments' incentives to extract rent from consumers in the third country. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that social welfare under R&D cartels with full information sharing, i.e., RJV cartels, cannot surpass that under R&D/RJV competition, whereas forming an R&D/RJV cartel works well for environmental investment. Among the policy implications, we show that governments can maximize global welfare by collectively determining whether to allow R&D/RJV cartels.
机译:我们使用Cournot Duopoly的第三国模型研究战略环境政策,国际研发卡特尔和研究合资企业(RJV)之间的关系。我们表明,形成R&D / RJV卡特尔减少了政府的激励措施,以从第三国消费者提取租金。与传统的智慧相反,我们发现,在R&D卡特尔下的社会福利有完整的信息共享,即RJV卡特尔,不能超过R&D / RJV竞争,而形成R&D / RJV卡特尔适合环境投资。在政策影响中,我们表明政府可以通过集体确定是否允许R&D / RJV卡特尔来最大限度地提高全球福利。

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