Environmental innovation and policy harmonization in international oligopoly

KEISUKE HATTORI

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Environmental innovation and policy harmonization in international oligopoly

机译：国际寡头垄断中的环境创新与政策协调

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This paper investigates firm incentives for developing environmentally clean technologies in a simple two-country model with international oligopoly and lack of regulatory commitment, and compares the incentives under price and quantity regulations with and without policy cooperation between governments. We examine whether policy coordination (choices of policy instruments or policy harmonization) encourages environmental innovation when firms have strategic innovation incentives that may influence future regulation. In a case where policies are non-cooperatively set by governments, quantity regulations yield a greater static benefit for countries; however, dynamically, price regulations encourage more innovation than quantity regulations when environmental damages are not so large. Under both price and quantity regulation regimes, cooperative policy harmonization necessarily enhances net benefits in each country, whereas it discourages firms' innovation incentives when environmental damages are not so small.

机译：本文研究了在具有国际寡头和缺乏监管承诺的简单两国模型中开发环境清洁技术的企业激励措施，并比较了在有政府政策合作和没有政府政策合作的情况下在价格和数量监管下的激励政策。我们研究当企业具有可能影响未来监管的战略创新激励措施时，政策协调（选择政策手段或政策协调措施）是否鼓励环境创新。在政府非合作制定政策的情况下，数量法规可以为国家带来更大的静态收益；但是，动态地讲，当环境损害不是很大时，价格法规比数量法规鼓励更多的创新。在价格和数量监管制度下，合作政策的协调必定会提高每个国家的净收益，而在环境损害不是很小的情况下，它会阻碍企业的创新动机。

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《Environment and Development Economics》 |2013年第2期|162-183|共22页
作者
KEISUKE HATTORI;
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作者单位

Faculty of Economics, Osaka Universityiof Economics,2-2-8 Osumi, Higashiyodogazm-ku, Osaka 533-8533 Japan;

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收录信息美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);
原文格式 PDF
正文语种 eng
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Environmental innovation and policy harmonization in international oligopoly

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