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Efficiency and equity in groundwater markets: the case of Madhya Pradesh, India

机译：地下水市场的效率和公平性：印度中央邦的案例

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摘要

This paper examines efficiency and equity in groundwater markets with special attention to output sharing contracts and to the bargaining relationships between sellers and buyers, using household level data from Madhya Pradesh, India. Regression results find no significant inefficiency on farms managed by output sharing buyers, presumably because optimal input intensities are achieved through effective monitoring and contract adherence mechanisms embedded in long-term and intensive personal relationships between sellers and buyers. As for equity, the finding is that, while output sharing buyers pay higher water prices, the rate of premiums is merely 5 percentage points higher than the informal interest rate that they would have had to carry under other types of groundwater contracts. The results also show that buyers who have access to alternative water sellers pay lower water prices. These findings indicate that if the imperfection of credit and contingent markets in rural areas are taken into account, informal groundwater markets work fairly well in agrarian communities if monitoring and contract adherence mechanisms are embedded and a sufficient number of potential sellers are available.
机译：本文研究了地下水市场的效率和公平性，特别关注了产出共享合同以及买卖双方之间的讨价还价关系，使用了来自印度中央邦的家庭数据。回归结果发现，在由产出共享购买者管理的农场上，效率没有显着降低，大概是因为最佳的投入强度是通过有效的监视和嵌入在买卖双方之间长期且紧密的个人关系中的合同遵守机制来实现的。至于股本，发现是，尽管产出共享的买者支付更高的水价，但溢价率仅比他们根据其他类型的地下水合同将不得不承担的非正式利率高出5个百分点。结果还表明，有权使用替代水卖方的买方支付的水价较低。这些发现表明，如果考虑到农村地区信贷和或有市场的不完善性，那么如果建立了监测和遵守合同的机制并且有足够数量的潜在卖方，非正式的地下水市场在农业社区中的运作就会很好。

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