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Harvesting the Commons

机译:收获公地

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摘要

We study a socio-ecological model in which a continuum of consumers harvest a common property renewable natural resource. Markov perfect Nash equilibria of the corresponding non-cooperative game are derived and are compared with collectively optimal harvesting policies. The underlying mechanisms that drive open-access commons in our model are shaped by population size, harvesting costs, and the ecosystem's productivity. If other things equal population is small relative to harvesting costs, unmanaged commons do not face destruction. More strikingly, they are harvested at the collectively optimal rate. Property rights do not matter in that parametric regime because the resource has no social scarcity value. However, if other things equal population is large relative to harvesting costs, open-access renewable natural resources suffer from the tragedy of the commons. Property rights matter there because the resource has a social scarcity price. The population size relative to harvesting costs at which the socio-ecological system bifurcates is an increasing function of the ecosystem's productivity. A sudden crash in productivity, population overshoot, or decline in harvesting costs can tip an unmanaged common into ruin. The model provides a way to interpret historical and archaeological findings on the collapse of those societies that have been studied by scholars.
机译:我们研究了一种社会生态模型,其中,连续的消费者收获了共有财产的可再生自然资源。推导了相应非合作博弈的马尔可夫完美纳什均衡,并与集体最优收获策略进行了比较。在我们的模型中,推动开放获取共享空间的基本机制受人口规模,收获成本和生态系统生产力的影响。如果相对于收成成本而言,其他人口数量相等的地方很小,那么不受管理的公地就不会面临破坏。更惊人的是,它们以集体最优的速度收获。产权在该参数化制度中并不重要,因为资源没有社会稀缺性价值。但是,如果相对于收获成本而言,其他人口均等的情况很多,那么开放获取的可再生自然资源将遭受公地悲剧的困扰。产权在那里很重要,因为资源具有社会稀缺性的价格。相对于社会生态系统分叉的收获成本而言,人口规模是生态系统生产力的增长功能。生产力的突然崩溃,人口超支或收割成本的下降可能会使不受管理的普通人破产。该模型为解释学者研究的那些社会崩溃的历史和考古发现提供了一种方法。

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